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RECENT CASES
than one which might have found that Greenwald's statement was a request
for counsel.
The dissent suggests that petitioner did not cite Escobedo and therefore
the majority was wrong to consider it in its opinion. The Supreme Court should
not be prevented from arriving at a proper decision because of an error or
omission of citation especially in a case such as this where a layman prepared
the petition for the writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court should always be free
to cite the law of the land independent of the erudition and diligence of the
adversaries. Certainly a court which can make an independent examination of
the record to determine whether a confession is voluntary cannot be prevented
from making a determination of the law independent of the accuracy of the
petition. The days when cases were won and lost by the skill in preparing the
pleadings has long since past.
It must be concluded that Escobedo played a major role in the decision,
even though the Court couched its opinion in traditional totality of circumstances
language. The case shows how far the Escobedo and Miranda decisions influenced the application of the totality of circumstances test even though those
decisions were not directly applicable. Thus it may well be that the totality of
circumstances test has been liberalized in the light of these decisions and that
confessions will be more easily excluded when Miranda and Escobedo do not
apply directly. In other words it appears that the Supreme Court will consider
more closely the denial of counsel and failure to provide an adequate warning
about constitutional rights in cases which arise between the decisions in
Escobedo and Miranda. Even though these decisions are not to be applied
retroactively they may have important bearing on confessions which are tested
under the totality of circumstances standard.
EDWIN H. WOLF

LABOR LAW-PLANT REMOVAL-EMPLOYEES HAVE
REEMPLOYMENT AT NEW PLANT SITE BASED ON SENIORITY

No

RIGHT

To

Throughout the 1950's the Lux Manufacturing Company1 periodically removed departments from its Waterbury, Connecticut plant to its other plants
in Lebanon, Tennessee, and Canada; each removal resulting in layoffs of employees from the Waterbury plant. In March of 1961, for economic reasons, Lux
transferred two departments from the Waterbury plant to the Lebanon plant,
causing a susbtantial employee layoff at the Waterbury plant. In July of 1961,
the assets of the Lux Company 2 were acquired by the Robertshaw Controls Company. Thereafter, pursuant to the March layoff, the union and certain of its
individual members on behalf of themselves, brought an action in federal district
1. Hereinafter referred to as Lux.
2. Hereinafter referred to as Robertshaw.
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court against Robertshaw to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal from that decision the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held, the seniority provisions of the collective agreement did not give employees from the Waterbury
plant any right of recall at the Lebanon plant. U.A.W. Local 1251 v. Robertshaw
Controls Company 405 F.2d 29. (2d Cir. 1968).
Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act 3 gives federal
courts jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements.
This section has been construed to give them the power to fashion a body of
federal substantive laws based primarily on "the policy of our national labor
laws" for the enforcement of collective agreements. 4 The Supreme Court realizing the difficulty of fashioning a new body of federal law, subsequently construed "national labor policy" to require arbitration whenever it was possible.,
Generally, arbitration may be enforced even after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement as long as the grievance involved took place during the
life of the contract.6 However, where there is no basis for arbitration, as when
no difference arises between parties until the agreement has terminated, 7 or
when there is no arbitration clause, the courts must develop their own rules
in disputes brought under section 301(a).18 Because a collective bargaining
agreement has traditionally been considered a contract,9 the judiciary has invoked a variety of contract theories to characterize the collective bargaining
relationship. 10 At present, however, there is wide recognition that a collective
3. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964), which reads: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
4. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) ; cf. United Steehvorkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
6. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); N.L.R.B. v. Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1957).
7. Piano and Musical Instr. Wkrs. Union, Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d
761 (7th Cir. 1964).

8. Comment, Section 301(a) and the Federal Common Law of Labor Agreements, 75

Yale L.J. 877, 889-92 (1966).
9. Note, Rights and Obligations Upon Termination of the Collective Bargaining Contract, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 416 (1962).
10. "The judiciary has not always grasped the changing philosophies which have

occurred in dealing with the labor movement. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that when
originally faced with the problem of determining the rights secured by a collective bargaining contract, the judiciary often found it necessary to resort to various established legal

theories. In this manner, they were frequently able to invoke traditional contract and
agency principles and still reach a result which was desirable from a modern labor standpoint.

One such theory was that the collective bargaining agreement (or craft agreement as it was
then termed) created a "custom?' or "usage" and until abrogated, became a part of the
individual employment contract. At least one jurisdiction gave consideration to an agency
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agreement is different from a normal commercial contract." A collective agreement, like a contract, states rights and duties of the parties, although, it is more
than a contract and has been characterized as "... . a generalized code to govern

a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate."' 2 Despite the
fact that the collective agreement is markedly different from a commercial contract, it is clear that contract principles are still a substantial factor in their
interpretation.' 5 Most employee rights, including seniority, are considered to be
acquired from and limited by the collective bargaining agreement, 14 while some
rights, such as vacation pay, severance pay and pensions, are thought to be
accrued during the life of the agreement and therefore not terminated by the
expiration of the agreement.' 5 In contrast, it has been held that seniority
rights are terminated by either expiration of the contract or sale of the
business, 16 except that where the business is sold seniority may continue to
exist if there is a finding that the buyer either expressly' 7 or impliedly 8
assumed the collective agreement. Also, seniority rights are destroyed when
the company completely terminates its activities.' 9 Where the parties have
included a clause in the labor contract explicitly dealing with the existence
or termination of seniority rights on the occurrence of a state contingency,
such as expiration of the agreement, it seems clear that the courts will enforce
rationale, which regarded the union as agent of the employees. The effect was to make
the collective bargaining agreement a direct contract between the employer and the employee.
But, perhaps, the most widely accepted theory was that which regarded the collective
agreement as a third party beneficiary contract between the employer and the union for
the benefit of the individual employees. Although, these constructs, singularly or in combination, may prove to be highly useful in determining rights and remedies under a specific
collective bargaining contract, they may, nonetheless, become dangerous when used artificially,
without regard to underlying questions of policy." Id. at 417.
11. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers of America v.Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Cox, The
Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1958); Shulman,
Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999, 1001-02, 1024 (1955);
Note, supra note 9 at 416.
12. United Steelworkers of America v. Warder & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
13. Note, supra note 9 at 419.
14. Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371
U.S. 941 (1962); Local Lodge 2040, Int'l. Ass'n. of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692
(1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 884 (1959); Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361
(6th Cir. 1945); 2 B. Werne, Administration of the Labor Contract § 38 (1963).
15. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc. Kaftan v. Siegel 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940)
(vacation pay); Botany Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 50 N.J. Super.
18, 141 A.2d 107 (N.J. App. Div. 1958) (pension); Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J.
537, 120 A.2d 442 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1956) (severance pay).
16. Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); System Federation
No. 59 v. Louisiana and A. Ry., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 656
(1941).
17. Patton Throwing Mills, Inc., 13 Lab. Arb. 615 (1949); see L. Simpson, Handbook
of the Law of Contracts § 206 (2d ed. 1965).
18. Home Fuel and Supply Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 66 (1955); Clendennings, Inc., 7 Lab.
Arb. 580 (1947); see L. Simpson, supranote 17.
19. Local 2040, Int'l. Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
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this clause under contract theory. 20 Yet the effect of such a clause may be
nullified, since rights so given may be subsequently bargained away be the
21
employee or his authorized representative.
Another event which may effect seniority rights is plant removal; well
established doctrines prohibit plant removals based upon prohibited motives. For
instance, if a plant removal is motivated by non-economic (i.e. anti-union) reasons, it may be considered an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (1) and
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.22 On the other hand, if the plant
removal is for economic reasons and not merely to avoid the duty of collective
bargaining, the move will not be considered an unfair labor practice. 23 Even if
the motivation for plant removal is composed of both economic and anti-union
reasons, the move is valid so long as the primary motivation is economic. 2 4 Although a removal may be motivated solely by economic reasons, the employer is
required to notify the union of his intent to move or he will be subject to the
assessment of an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 25 An employer, although not required to bargain with the union over its decision to terminate for economic reasons, 20 must bargain over the
impact of the closing on employees whose jobs will be affected,2 7 including transferal of employees to the new job location.2 8 Barring the presence of specific contractual prohibition, a plant removal in accordance with the above cited principles
will not likely constitute a breach of the collective agreement. However, where a
clause explicitly dealing with plant removal is present, the courts will generally
enforce it 29 and often impose severe penalties for violation of such a clause. 0
20. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960),

modified, 298 F.2d 277 (3rd Cir. 1962) ; Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change:
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 Minn. L. Rev. 505, 522 (1963).
21. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Giordana v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
203 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1962); Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 203 F. Supp. 636
(ED. Mich. 1962).
22. N.L.R.B. v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); Reynolds
Pallet and Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Deena Products
Co., 195 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827 (1952).
23. N.L.R.B. v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961); N.L.R.B. v. E.C.
Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); Re Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 411 (1961).
24. N.L.R.B. v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); N.L.R.B. v. Lassing,
284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961); Mt. Hope Finishing Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
25. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B.
v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. N.L.R.B. v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B.
v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); N.L.R.B. v. Win. J.
Burns International Dective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965); But see Ozark Trailers,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), which gives the position of the N.L.R.B. that an employee
is obligated to bargain with the union about a decision to terminate any portion of its
operations.
27. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B.
v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); N.L.R.B. v. Rapid
Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); N.L.R.B. v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
28. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B.
v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
29. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
modified, 298 F.2d 277 (3rd Cir. 1962) ; Kennicott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1653 (1964).
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While employee rights may be waived or bargained away, 31 such waivers are not
easily inferred. 32 If seniority rights are not waived, it has been held that the
rights will be retained if the plant moves to a new location within the geographical area to which the collective bargaining agreement applies. 33 Conversely, if the plant relocates outside the geographical boundaries of the agree34
ment, it has been held that seniority rights will not survive.
Controversy has developed over the question of whether employees have a
right to be reemployed based on seniority at the new plant site in a plant removal situation. This problem is largely attributable to the holdings in Zdanok
v. Glidden Co.3 5 and Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Co., Inc.,36 which -Were
decided within a year of each other based on similar facts with the respective
courts arriving at opposite conclusions. In Glidden, the collective bargaining
agreement contained a provision on the seniority clause which gave employees
who were laid off with five or more years of continuous employment the right
to be reemployed based on their seniority, if an opening occurred within three
years after the layoff. The union and the company normally negotiated for
agreements with a two-year duration. Six weeks prior to the expiration date
for one of these two-year agreements, the Glidden Company notified the union
that the contract would be terminated at the expiration date because the
company was moving the plant from Elmhurst, New York, to a new location
at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The jobs of the employees were terminated at the
time of the plant removal and the company refused to rehire at the new location
based on seniority acquired at the old plant. Employees at the old plant
brought an action against Glidden for breach of a collective bargaining agreement made for their benefit by the union. Noting that employees with over five
years of seniority retained their right to recall for three years after layoff, the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that the parties must
have contemplated that seniority rights would survive the collective bargaining
agreement with its two-year duration and therefore, the employer should not be
able to unilaterally terminate the employees' rights merely by failing to renew
the contract. The court also observed that some employee rights, such as
retirement rights, were treated as vested rights because they were considered
30. Local 127 Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962);
Selb. Mfg. Co. v. Int'l. Ass'n of Machinists, 305 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962).
31. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
32. N.L.R.B. v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955) ; California Portland Cement
Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952); Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
33. Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 941 (1962); Metal Polishers v. Viking Equipment Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1960);
Slenczka v. Hoover Ball and Bearing Co., 215 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
34. Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1966); Slenczka
v.. Hoover Ball and Bearing Co., 215 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
35. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961),
aff'd on rehearing327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944 (1964), hereinafter
referred to as Zdanok.
36. Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 941 (1962), hereinafter referred to as Ross.

383

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to be earned over the course of the employment and due the employee when he
met the requirements specified in the contract. By analogy, the court reasoned
that seniority rights should be considered similarly vested and due when the
contract provisions were met. In view of the subsequent criticism, it seems that
the court's denomination of seniority rights as "vested" was unfortunate and
probably implied more status to the rights than the court intended to give them.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the court intended to convey the fact that the
seniority rights here endured beyond the termination of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Another aspect of the seniority rights, their possible geographic limitation,
was put in question by a statement in the preamble of the agreement that it was
made by the Glidden Company "for and on behalf of its plant facilities located
at Corona Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York."37 The
court interpreted the clause as a mere reference to the then existing situation
rather than as a territorial limitation on rights granted in the agreement, contending that it was unreasonable to interpret the contract so that it would not
apply if the company moved a few blocks or a few miles. Finally, stating that,
"We can see no expense or embarrassment to the defendant which would have
resulted from its adopting the more rational, not to say humane, construction of
its contract," 38 the Glidden court concluded that the employees had a right to
re-employment at the new plant site based on the seniority rights acquired
under the collective agreement at the Long Island plant.
In Ross, the company informed employees at the Detroit plant, through a
series of notices, that a new plant was under construction at Lebanon, Tennessee, and that, for economic reasons, part of the Detroit production would be
transferred to the new facility-the extent of the transfer to be determined
by economic studies. The union at the Detroit plant consequently insisted that
those employees who lost their jobs at Detroit as a result of the transfers be reemployed at the Lebanon plant based on the seniority obtained at Detroit. The
company refused to accede to the union demands, insisting that workers laid off
in Detroit had no reemployment rights in Lebanon. Later the company announced that the economic studies dictated that the Detroit plant be closed,
whereupon the employees initiated an action against the company for a declaration of their rights under the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit began by considering
the effect of the following provisions from the collective agreement:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this 19th day of December,
1958, by and between GEMMER MANUFACTURING COMPANY
(of Detroit, Michigan), which is a division of Ross Gear and Tool
37.

Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 288 F.2d 99, 103-04, (2d Cir.

1961), aff'd on rehearing, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944 (1964).
38. Id. at 104.
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Company, Inc. (a corporation of Lafayette, Indiana), and which
Gemmer is hereinafter referred to as the "Company" and the INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
UAW (AFL-CIO), AND LOCAL 80, THEREOF, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union."
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement desire to promote the
spirit of harmony and cooperation between them and insure the most
efficient operation of the Company's plant, the following agreement
is entered into:
RECOGNITION
1. The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in its plant or plants which are located in
that portion of the greater Detroit area which is located within the city
limits of Detroit for the purpose of collective bargaining on matters
of wages, hours and conditions of employment, excluding those
mentioned in the next succeeding paragraph. 39
Noting that the recognition clause referred to employees in the city of Detroit
and not to any specific plant, the court reasoned that the clause could not be
passed off as a mere reference to the plant's present location. It therefore,
reasoned that the clause unambiguously limited the territorial scope of the
rights given to employees under the agreement, to the Detroit city limits. The
court distinguished the clause here from that in Glidden, on which the plaintiffs
relied heavily, saying that here there was geographical limitation whereas the
Glidden contract merely contained an ambiguous reference to plant location in
its preamble. Based on that interpretation, the court concluded that in general,
the agreement bestowed no rights at any place outside the Detroit city limits
and specifically not at the new plant in Lebanon, Tennessee. Next the court
considered plaintiff's argument that seniority rights were "vested," based on
the holding in Glidden. But the court rejected the argument because "vested"
connotes that such rights may not be cut off by unilateral action of the company,
yet the collective bargaining agreement itself provided for the loss of seniority
rights under certain conditions, such as death of an employee or discharge of
an employee without reinstatement by grievance procedures. The fact that
the union made no claim of "vested" seniority rights until after the Glidden
decision was published influenced the court's construction of the agreement.
The union's actions under the agreement indicated that it never thought the
employees were receiving "vested" seniority rights, which suggested that the
union merely sought to take advantage of the Glidden decision. However, in
determining this issue the court made it clear that whether seniority rights
continued in existence beyond the end of the agreement was an entirely different
question which was not considered in this case. In the final analysis, this
decision was based wholly on the finding that rights given in the agreement
39. Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 142 at 147 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
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were subject to a geographical limitation, the court concluding therefore, that
the employees were not entitled to reemployment at the new plant based on
seniority accumulated in Detroit.
In Robertshaw, the validity of the plant removal was not contested. The
two primary issues before the court were: (1) Whether the intention of the
parties manifested in the collective agreement was to give the Waterbury employees the right to reemployment at the new plant based on seniority acquired
at the Waterbury plant and (2) If not, whether other equitable considerations
dictated this construction of the agreement. The court noted that no language
in the contract expressly granted the Waterbury employees rights outside the
Waterbury plant. Further, the court determined that the bargaining history
between the union and the company demonstrated no basis on which to construe the agreement to give Waterbury employees rights at the Lebanon plant,
inasmuch as the union had failed to demand any rights relating to termination
of employment prior to the 1960 negotiations, despite its prior experience with
the company's periodic department removals. Therefore, the court found that
there was no evidence that the parties intended to confer on the employees a
right to reemployment at the Lebanon plant. Instead the court found that the
sole basis for the union's contention was the court's holding in Glidden, that
seniority rights survived both termination of the collective agreement and a
change in plant location of considerable distance. The court then noted that
since its inception, the Glidden doctrine had received little support from law
reviews, labor arbitrators and subsequent cases, 40 all of which seemed to prefer
the contrary holding of Ross. The court felt that underlying the Glidden decision was the misconception that, once established, seniority acquired a status
apart from the contract, in which its attributes were determined by equitable
considerations and national labor policy. This misconception, the court felt,
imposed a substitute agreement on the parties based on considerations which
were improper because they were too obscure and because they came from
outside the agreement, whereas the contested rights were to be created and
limited by the intentions of the parties embodied in the collective agreement.
The court, therefore, expressly overruled Glidden, although in his concurring
opinion, Judge Waterman pointed out that Robertshaw was easily distinguishable from Glidden on its operative facts and might have been decided without
overruling Glidden.
The overruling of Glidden need not represent a very substantial blow to
the job security of employees, since they may protect their interests by insisting
on appropriate provisions in the collective agreement. Furthermore, the overruling of Glidden seems a desirable result because of certain problems in the
Glidden rationale. Basically they stem from the court's reasoning in each of
the case's two facets: (1) the question of whether seniority rights survive under
the contract and (2) if the contract does not resolve the issue, whether
40. U.A.W. Local 1251 v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1968).
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seniority rights survive without the contract. A court may give effect to seniority
rights at a relocated plant by making a finding to that effect under either the
first or the second question; but if it is determined that the contract expressly
prevents the survival of seniority rights at a relocated plant, the case is decided
and the second issue is never reached. In Glidden, one construction of the
statement in the preamble to the collective bargaining agreement is that it was
made "for and on behalf of" the Long Island plant, would place a geographical
limitation on the rights granted in the agreement, thereby preventing survival of
seniority rights at the new plant. However, the court alternatively chose to
construe the statement as merely a reference to the existing situation. An examination of the case yields no convincing reasoning to support the court's
preference for this construction; indeed both constructions appear to be equally
reasonable. Therefore, since it is clear that principles of contract interpretation
are largely applicable to collective bargaining agreements, it is hard to see why
the court did not require evidence as to the intent of the parties before construing the statement. 4 1 Most probably, the statement was merely meant as a
recognition clause, indicating that Glidden recognized the union as bargaining
agent for the employees at the plant described. In that case the recognition
clause has no bearing whatsoever on survival of seniority rights, and does not
imply any limitation on seniority rights. However, as long as the issue was
raised, the fact that the court did not consider the intent of the parties detracted
from the validity of its holdings. If the parties intended that the statement
should constitute a geographical limitation, the court would have been forced to
hold for the company despite its conviction that the employees' case was
otherwise valid. It should be noted that contrary to Glidden, Ross found that
there was a geographical limitation and held for the company solely on that
basis. However, Ross dealt with a clause that placed such a clear limitation on
rights granted in the agreement that it is probable even the Glidden court would
have arrived at the same conclusion. Nevertheless, this shows that despite the
fact that Ross and Glidden arrived at opposite conclusions, their holdings are
not inconsistent. While Ross was based entirely on interpretation of the contract, Glidden's interpretation of the contract merely opened the way for its
resolution of the case based on another issue.
The other issue, whether seniority rights survive plant relocation where the
collective bargaining agreement does not decide the question, was resolved by
Glidden based on the controversial concept of vested seniority rights.4 2 Under
the better view this concept is incorrect and misleading. For the idea of vested
41. "Parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations is admissible, even where
the parties have adopted the written document as the final and complete expression of their
contract, for the purpose of explaining ambiguous expressions in writing and to explain latent
ambiguities in the contract."
L. Simpson, supra note 17 at § 101, see 3 A. Corbin on Contracts § 579 (1960).
42. Lowden, Survival of Seniority Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Zdanok v. Glidden Co. 48 Vir. L. Rev. 291, 296-98; Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature
Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1553 (1962).
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seniority rights is directly opposed to the widely accepted view that seniority

rights are created and limited solely by the collective bargaining agreement.
Assigning to seniority the attributes of vestedness would indicate that the employee receives an immediate fixed right which cannot be altered, changed or
taken away without the consent of the employees. 48 However, it has been held
that seniority rights are ended when a company terminates its business, 44 that
seniority rights may be altered or bargained away by the employee's bargaining
40
agent, 45 and that seniority rights cannot be passed on by the employee at death.
So, by according to seniority rights the status of being vested, the court attributed more status to them than they in fact enjoy; and this misconception formed
the basis on which the court held that the seniority rights were applicable at the
new plant location.
In addition to the specific problems in its rationale, Glidden, as well as
other plant relocation cases, suffers from failure to properly articulate the real
nature of the problem involved. Perhaps this problem stems from the relative
dearth of information which the courts receive on many facets of the issue. It
is said that the basic dispute involved in these cases is the conflict between the
requirement of the economy for free mobility of industry and the interest of
employees on job security. 47 The theory is that for the economy to achieve the
best utilization of economic resources, industry must be free to move wherever
it can secure the lowest combination of costs, and that allowing employees to
be rehired at the new plant based on their seniority will hinder managenent's
freedom of movement. On the other hand, plant relocation means that employees
at the old plant will lose their jobs. Many of the senior employees will have
considerable difficulty in finding new jobs, and those that succeed will lose many
benefits which are based on seniority. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption
that employees who are rehired at the new plant will receive the same wage
that they received at the old plant. If the assumption were true, naturally a
requirement that employees be rehired at the new plant based on seniority could
be a great hindrance to plant mobility, particularly where the motivation for
removal was primarily the burden of excessive labor costs. However, reemployment based on seniority does not necessarily imply that wages will remain at
the level of the old plant; the only essential inference is that employees will
receive a preferential right to employment at a new plant. Since the old collective bargaining agreement would not necessarily be applicable to the new plant
in this situation, all wages and benefits would have to be renegotiated between
43.

3A Corbin on Contracts § 742 (1960).

44. Local 2040, Int'l. Ass'n. of Machinists v. Serve], Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
45. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Giordana v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,
203 F. Supp. 905 (D. N. J. 1962); Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 203 F. Supp. 636
(EDl. Mich. 1962).
46. Aaron, supra note 42 at 1540.
47. Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1100 (1964);
Comment, Industrial Mobility and Survival of Seniority-What Price Security?, 36 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 269 (1963).
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the company and the employee at the new plant. In most situations then, requiring that employees be rehired at the new plant based on seniority would not
necessarily be detrimental to the company. In fact, it would often be beneficial
inasmuch as the company could then take advantage of the expertise which
the employees had acquired at the old plant. One exception might be where the
company could not move except for tax advantages and financing which were
given by the state in which the new plant was to be located, with the expectation that more jobs would be created for state residents. Since, the company
was forced to bring its entire labor force with it, the state might withdraw the
financial advantages, making it uneconomical for the company to move. At the
old plant site, the company might well be faced with the prospect of going out
of business, in which case the economy would be irreparably damaged with no
offsetting gain to anyone. In such a situation, it would certainly seem improper
to grant employees the right to reemployment at the new plant.
It seems apparent that there is a wide variety of situations and economic
interests which must be balanced in determining the advisability of granting
reemployment at a new plant based on seniority, including the interests of the
economy as a whole, the employees, the company and the communities involved.
Perhaps too little information has been presented on these issues, or perhaps
the attorneys have simply failed to raise them. In any case, the courts have
been reluctant to delve very deeply into these types of considerations despite
the fact that they are the very heart of the problem. Another consideration which
has received relatively little attention, although it would seem of paramount
importance in deciding these cases, is whether or not a substantial number of
employees would actually seek reemployment at the new plant. The discussion
above assumed that all employees would move with the plant if given the opportunity. However, in a strong economy such as we have today, it is likely
that the employee's ties with the community are so strong and his chances for
reemployment so good, that he would be reluctant to move. In this situation,
it should make little difference to the company whether or not a right to reemployment at the new plant is granted to the employees, because so few employees would move that there could be no significant economic effect on the
company. On the other hand, if the economy were weak and the jobs were
scarce, a much larger percentage of the workers would be willing to move with
with the company. Only then would the court have to examine the exact nature
of the company's economic problem to determine the extent to which the company might be harmed if employees were granted the right to reemployment at
the new plant. The foregoing discussion is only demonstrative of a few of the
considerations of this type which are relevant to the resolution of the issue.
Where the collective agreement does not determine the question, these considerations should play a major role in the outcome. With the multitude of diverse
situations and interests in these cases, it is impossible to devise a single rule or
result which is proper in every case. Therefore, the courts should demand more
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information on the possible consequences in a case and carefully consider this
information in arriving at their decision.
Although Robertshaw commendably overturns Glidden, the decision creates
further difficulties of its own. The court determines the case by deciding essentially that the plaintiff-employees did not meet their burden of proof with
regard to the survival of seniority rights at the new plant. Based on a normal
procedural rule, the decision would have been perfectly acceptable, except that
the court went further and strongly implied (although it did not state it explicitly) that the burden of proof must be met by evidence solely from the contract. The difficulty with this apparently neutral standard is that, as a practical
matter, it may amount to an affirmative rule that seniority does not survive
plant removal in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary; and this
without consideration of the substantive aspects of the case. It is already clear
that an express provision in the agreement will govern a case, therefore, the real
issue involved is whether seniority rights are applicable at a relocated plant
where the collective agreement gives no guidance on the question. In that situation, the burden of proof obviously could never be met by evidence solely from
the collective agreement. In addition, when a company is relocating a plant, the
union's bargaining position is extremely weak. Despite any strikes, picket lines
or other pressure which the union might exert, the company is virtually certain
to be able to secure sufficient help to remove equipment from the old plant.
Therefore, it will always be the employees, rather than the company, who are
forced to bring the suit; and under Robertshaw, they will be faced with the
necessity of meeting a burden of proof which cannot be met. Such a solution
hardly seems desirable inasmuch as the substance of the case will never be considered.
A much better resolution of the problem would be to adopt the approach to
interpreting collective bargaining agreements used in United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. 48 The union in that case sought
to have a grievance arbitrated under the arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, the company refused to arbitrate, claiming that
the arbitration provision was not applicable because the grievance complained
of was excepted by a clause which provided that, "matters which are strictly
a function of management shall not be subject to arbitration under this section."
The agreement gave no further guidance as to whether the particular grievance
was in fact a "function of management," and therefore, the issue fell into the
category of one which was within the subject matter of a collective agreement,
but which could not be resolved by the agreement. Recognizing that collective
bargaining agreements are considerably different from commercial contracts, the
court adopted the solution which it had earlier urged in Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills:
48.
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The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits
under § 301(a)? We conclude that the substantive to apply in suits
under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws. . . The Labor-Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what
parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will
lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack
express statutory sanction, but will be solved by looking at the policy
of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
inventiveness will be determined by the
policy. The range of judicial
49
nature of the problem.
Considering the relevant concepts of policy which were embodied in our national
labor laws, the Warrior and Gulf court found that the national labor policy favored the use of arbitration whenever possible in settling labor grievances;
therefore, it directed that the union's grievance should be arbitrated. This approach is markedly different from the Robertshaw rule that only contractual
evidence is valid to meet the burden of proof, in that, under Warrior and Gulf
the burden of proof could also be met by evidence of relevant concepts of policy
which are reflected in the national labor laws. The explanation for this difference
lies in the fact that the Robertshaw rule is extracted from rules applicable to
commercial contracts, whereas Warrior and Gulf recognizes that a collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract. Applying Warrior and Gulf approach
to Robertshaw, a court would identify the relevant policies which best served
those policies. Thus, where an issue was within the subject matter of a collective
bargaining agreement but could not be resolved by it, a plaintiff could meet the
burden of proof by showing that national labor policy dictated a decision in his
favor. This approach is clearly superior to the Robertshaw method of deciding
these cases on procedural grounds. It resolves issues based on their substantive
aspects, plus it is flexible enough to allow for different results in cases dealing
with the same issue, but where the facts and interests which are involved vary
greatly. In addition, the inclusion of national labor policy as a relevant factor
would allow decisions on an issue to be continuously aligned with the latest
thinking on the subject as it is manifested in the national labor laws.
WILLIAM
49. 353 U.S. 443, 456-57 (1957).
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